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The term "race" takes for granted what those who use it take it to
mean, and what they take it to mean may mean anything, and what
may mean anything, in fact, means nothing.
- Ashley Montagu' (1963)
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1970s, universities throughout the United States have con-
sciously sought to admit greater numbers of racial minorities in order to
achieve "racial" diversity in their student bodies. The universities have
proclaimed that diversity is beneficial to both the educational process and
to the students immersed in the diversity. Racial diversity teaches stu-
dents how to interact with a variety of dissimilar people, overcome bias
and stereotypes, and to think with different viewpoints.
To accomplish this diversity, universities ask applicants to identify their
race from five to seven enumerated choices,' standard in government pol-
icy-making on their admissions application so that the university can de-
termine if the applicant will diversify its school in the manner it is
seeking. This attempt at creating diversity, however, is overly broad and
1. ASHLEY MONTAGU, RACE, SCIENCE, AND HUMANITY 61 (1963).
2. See, e.g., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, RACIAL AND ETHNIC
CLASSIFICATIONS USED IN CENSUS 2000 AND BEYOND (2000) (stating "other" is an op-
tional race category). Applicants usually, but not always, have the option of choosing
"other on university admission applications." Id.
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severely flawed. The hypothetical below illustrates the problem with us-
ing these standard, overly broad racial classifications.
Let's say that you own an automobile museum that can display one
hundred cars. People come to the museum to see an array of automo-
biles. To maximize the museum experience, you show as many different
kinds of cars as possible. Therefore, you solicit cars from automobile
dealerships across the country by assuring them that the museum will
provide valuable publicity for the dealerships. To have a car displayed at
the museum, you ask each dealership to submit an application including
only their contact information, how much they are willing to sell the car
to the museum for, and whether they are sending a "Ford," "GM,"
"Daimler-Chrysler," "Honda," "Toyota," or "BMW." Based on the ap-
plications received you choose to include forty GMs, twenty Fords,
twenty Toyotas, ten Hondas, six Chryslers, and four BMWs. Will you
achieve the diversity you were seeking through this method? Probably
not. What if all twenty Fords you receive are Mustangs? You will never
actually know if you are going to achieve a high level of diversity from
just looking at the make of the cars. However, you could have easily
attempted to acquire a variety of other Ford models by simply asking the
dealers to identify the model of the car in the application. By not acquir-
ing information on the models that will be sent, you passed on an oppor-
tunity to ensure a diverse body of automobiles at the museum.
The automobile museum's flawed submission policy is an example that
mirrors the underlying problems with using race-based university admis-
sions policies. The use of race-based programs, themselves, are not inher-
ently problematic; but rather, choosing to use broad classifications over
narrow classifications can lead to the exclusion of certain groups and will
not ensure diversity. From the above example, racial categories such as
Black, White, and Asian are analogous to the make of the automobile
and are much too broad to ensure diversity. Ethnic categories such as
Middle Eastern, Scandinavian, and Black-American are analogous to the
automobile's model and a much more precise identifier. The use of
ethnicity, like the use of car models, is likely to result in an increase in
diversity.
This article, instead, argues that despite the Supreme Court's ruling to
the contrary, the University of Michigan Law School's ("the University")
race-based admissions policies are not narrowly tailored to the school's
objective of diversifying its student body. The use of the broad and im-
precise classifications of race rather than the more tailored classifications
of nationality and ethnicity created an admissions program that should
have been declared unconstitutional under strict scrutiny analysis. Un-
fortunately, the Court overlooked the obvious differences between the
numerous sub-groups within each racial classification and allowed the
overly-broad classifications to stand.
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This article addresses the problems inherent in current racial classifica-
tions used in university admissions policies and how the Grutter v. Bollin-
ger3 decision placed the Court's imprimatur on the unanticipated but very
real discrimination that the classifications cause. Section II of this article
will provide a brief history on affirmative action, its goals, and its current
state; Section III will discuss the Grutter decision and its implications;
Section IV will address the historical foundation of racial classifications,
the problems caused by current racial classifications, and the harm caused
by imprecise self-identification; and, finally, Section V will present a solu-
tion to the problem and examine its potential shortcomings.
II. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
A. What Is Affirmative Action?
Affirmative action is a policy or a program that aimed at providing
minorities access to education, employment, health care, or social wel-
fare.4 The goal of affirmative action is to increase the representation of
underrepresented minorities in these areas of society.5 One of the under-
lying assumptions upon which affirmative action relies is that minorities
are not represented in proportionate or meaningful numbers in these
realms of society because of past societal discriminations.6 Thus, affirma-
tive action sought to repair these societal harms by requiring schools,
businesses, hospitals, and other institutions to take affirmative steps to
guarantee that minorities receive the special attention required to put
them on equal footing with their majority counterparts.7
President John F. Kennedy first used the term "affirmative action" in
1961, in an Executive Order that required federally funded projects to
take affirmative action to ensure that employment decisions were not ra-
cially discriminatory. 8 President Kennedy acted in response to the failure
3. 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (holding that the law school had a compelling interest in attain-
ing a diverse student body, and that admissions programs must be narrowly tailored to
serve its compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that result from a diverse
student body).
4. See ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE, http://eb.com (search "affirmative
action").
5. See id.
6. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 316, 328.
7. See, e.g., ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE, supra note 4.
8. Victoria Choy, Perpetuating the Exclusion of Asian Americans from the Affirmative
Action Debate: An Oversight of the Diversity Rationale in Grutter v. Bollinger, 38 U.C.
DAVIs L. REV. 545, 549 (2005) (stating the government must take affirmative action to
expand minorities' opportunities for employment).
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of the Civil Rights movement to ameliorate existing structural inequities
caused by past harms.
9
Since its inception, the constitutionality of affirmative action programs
has been repeatedly challenged on equal protection grounds.10 Under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, state gov-
ernments cannot discriminate against any person within their jurisdic-
tion.' Thus, many affirmative action opponents have argued that
affirmative action programs, which are inherently discriminatory towards
members of the majority, must violate the Fourteenth Amendment.12
However, the Supreme Court has held otherwise.
13
B. Affirmative Action in Higher Education
Universities and other high academic institutions began using affirma-
tive action to diversify their student bodies in the late 1960s and early
1970s.14 During these early years, universities used everything from
points systems, which awarded minority candidates extra application
"points" to set-aside programs, which gave minorities a set number of
guaranteed spots in the university." In 1978, White applicants chal-
lenged the constitutionality of set-aside programs in the landmark Su-
preme Court case Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.1 6
In Bakke, the majority concluded that numerical set-aside programs
are per se unconstitutional unless they are necessary to remedy clearly
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Metro Broad., Inc. v.
FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
11. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 ("No State shall ... deny to any person.., the
equal protection of the laws.").
12. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) ("A classification
which aids persons who are perceived as members of relatively victimized groups at the
expense of other innocent individuals is permissible only when there are judicial, legisla-
tive, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations.").
13. See Adarand Constr., Inc., 515 U.S. 200 (holding that petitioner could claim injury
owing to a discriminatory classification which prevented petitioner from competing on an
equal footing); Metro Broad., Inc., 497 U.S. 547 (holding that affirmative action is required
to correct past discrimination); J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (holding that because appel-
lant city failed to identify the need for remedial action in the awarding of its public con-
struction contracts, its treatment of its citizens on a racial basis violated the Equal
Protection Clause).
14. Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Grutter and Gratz: A Critical Analysis, 41 Hous. L. REV.
459, 460 (2004) (speculating the minority applicants did not otherwise have the academic
criteria necessary to gain admission without a deliberate preference).
15. Id.
16. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (addressing the complaints of white students who challenged
the method of admission arguing the school improperly considered race).
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proven past institutional discrimination. 17 In arriving at this conclusion,
the Court held that increasing the number of minority students in the
medical school, providing more doctors to underserved minority commu-
nities, and providing a remedy for past societal discriminations are not
necessary to accomplish the purpose of a student body diverse enough to
justify the use of suspect classifications.18 However, the most important
aspects of the Bakke ruling were Justice Powell's holdings that the diver-
sity of a university's student body is a compelling state interest and that
race could be used as a factor in the admissions process in order to en-
hance diversity, as long as it was not the only factor. 9
Bakke remained the law guiding affirmative action policies for the next
two decades,2 ° and many universities crafted their admissions programs
to conform to the Bakke decision.2 However, after nearly twenty years
of stagnation, the issue of race-based admissions in higher education re-
turned to courts in Hopwood v. Texas.22 In Hopwood, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals invalidated the University of Texas Law School's race-
based admissions policy after an underprivileged, highly- qualified, white
student challenged the policy after being denied admission.23 In doing so,
the Court re-opened the affirmative action debate, holding that Justice
Powell's diversity justification was not the law and never had been.24 This
holding, in turn, led to several new challenges in other circuits25 and
17. Id. at 271-72, 279, 319 (holding that because the University of California-Davis
Medical School's set-aside program was not narrowly tailored to remedy a past discrimina-
tion by the institution itself, it was held to be unconstitutional); see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 592, 594 (1997).
18. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 305-12 (holding that one cannot speculate as to the pur-
pose one will put their education towards, in the absence of empirical data).
19. Id. at 314-16.
20. Compare id., with Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), and Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
21. See Bloom, supra note 14, at 461.
22. Hopwood, 78 F.3d 932 (considering whether a law school may use race as a com-
ponent in admissions evaluation).
23. Id; see also The Long Arms of Cheryl Hopwood, 25 J. BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUC.
25 (1999) (resulting in a reduction of the number of black students at the Law School from
sixty-five to eleven).
24. Hopwood, 78 F.3d 932 ("Justice Powell's view in Bakke is not binding precedent
on [the use of diversity in admissions criteria]. While he announced the judgment, no other
Justice joined in that part of the opinion discussing the diversity rationale .... [D]iversity is
mentioned nowhere except in Justice Powell's single-Justice opinion. In fact, the four-Jus-
tice opinion, which would have upheld the special admissions program under intermediate
scrutiny, implicitly rejected Justice Powell's position.") (internal quotation omitted).
25. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 377 F.3d 949 (9th Cir.
2004); Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738 (2d Cir. 2000); Smith v.
Univ. of Wash. L. Sch., 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000).
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eventually brought the issue of affirmative action in higher education
back to the Supreme Court.2 6
III. GRUTFER v. BOLLINGER
With the affirmative action debate facing the Supreme Court in 1996,
the majority opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger27 settled several key issues
about what universities can and cannot do when using race-based admis-
sions programs.28 In short, the Court held that diversity of a student
body was a compelling state interest and that students contributed to di-
versity if they had either a distinguishable non-majority appearance 29 or
held a distinct set of minority viewpoints that distinguished them from the
majority.3 ° This section of the article details how the Court came to this
conclusion and why its rationale is illogical.
A. Procedural History
In the winter of 1996, Barbara Grutter, a forty-three year-old Cauca-
sian resident of Michigan, claimed she was denied admission to the Uni-
versity of Michigan School of Law because accepted minority students
were not held to the same academic standards as non-minority students.31
Grutter filed suit against the Law School on Equal Protection grounds.32
The Michigan district court sided with Grutter and invalidated the Uni-
versity's use of race in admissions because it was not narrowly tailored.33
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit subsequently overturned this
ruling, and in 2003, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.34
26. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (challenging the perceived unfairness of
white applicants' requirements to score higher on exams and have better grades than their
minority counterparts, in order to gain admissions to selective universities); Bloom, supra
note 14 (stating the Court's decisions clarify any confusion surrounding the use of race in
admissions calculations when they repeatedly "placed a judicial stamp of approval on a
relatively broad use of racial preferences by institutions of higher education").
27. Grutter, 539 U.S. 306.
28. Id. at 328-29 (permitting the use of race in order to enroll a "critical mass" of
minority students towards the compelling state interest in creating a diverse student body).
29. Id. at 355 n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 308, 330.
31. Id. at 316 (stating Grutter had a 3.8 undergraduate grade point average and a
LSAT score of 161 at the time of her application).
32. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 317 (arguing discriminatory use of race in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Civil Rights Act: Title VI, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981).




B. Summary of Grutter
By the time Grutter made its way to the Supreme Court, related issues
had developed which the Supreme Court sought to address in Grutter.35
Most importantly, the Court addressed the validity of Justice Powell's
opinion in Bakke.36 Also at issue was (1) which level of judicial scrutiny
to apply to affirmative action programs in higher education,37 (2) whether
student body diversity is a compelling state interest,38 and (3) whether the
Law School's admissions policies were narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling interest of diversity.39
In summary, the majority opinion written by Justice O'Connor reaf-
firmed Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, and the Court endorsed the use
of race in the admissions process a.4  Further, the Court decided that: (1)
strict scrutiny is required when examining the constitutionality of race-
based admissions programs, though scrutiny should take into considera-
tion a university's right to educational autonomy;41 (2) diversity of a uni-
versity's student body was a compelling state interest;42 and, (3) the Law
School's race-based admissions policies were narrowly tailored to its goal
of creating diversity.43
C. Why Is Diversity a Compelling Interest?
The first major premise upon which the Court rested its decision in
Grutter was that diversity, as an educational benefit, was a compelling
state interest.44 This means that the Court deems student body diversity
35. Id. at 325 (addressing whether Justice Powell's "diversity rationale" is precedent).
36. Id. (2003) ("In the wake of our fractured decision in Bakke, courts have struggled
to discern whether Justice Powell's diversity rationale ... is nonetheless binding prece-
dent."). Compare Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996) (declining to follow
Justice Powell's opinion on diversity stating "Justice Powell's argument in Bakke garnered
on his own vote and has never represented the view of a majority of the Court in Bakke or
any other case"), with Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1248
(2001) ("Simply put, Justice Powell's opinion does not establish student body diversity as a
compelling interest for purposes of this case.").
37. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325 (holding strict scrutiny is required to make classifications
based on race).
38. Id. (holding the state has a compelling interest in obtaining diversity in higher
education).
39. Id. at 334 ("We find that the Law School's admissions program bears the
hallmarks of a narrowly tailored plan.").
40. Id. at 325.
41. Id. at 328.
42. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 325 (identifying benefits such as lively classroom discussions, a semblance of
a workplace environment, and increasing the students likelihood of interactions with stu-
dents from different backgrounds in an educational and social setting).
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significant enough to justify the consideration of race in admissions poli-
cies to achieve that interest.45 The Court's outlining of educational bene-
fits supporting the state's compelling interest in diversity is sketchy at
best.4 6 In support of the need for diversity in higher education, the Court
considered numerous amicus briefs,47 which resulted in a convoluted defi-
nition of "diversity. 4
8
Ultimately, the Court deferred to the University on the matter of
whether or not diversity is a compelling interest. 49 Despite the strict scru-
tiny level of judicial review mandated by Adarand Constr. v. Peiia,50 Jus-
tice O'Connor decided that the Court was ill equipped to make "complex
educational judgments."5' Instead, the Court deferred to the University's
own examinations and evaluations regarding the necessity of diversity of
student body.52 Not surprisingly, the University found that diversity was,
indeed, a compelling interest for its mission.53
The obvious flaw in the procession of Grutter was that the Court did
not strictly scrutinize the central issues of whether or not diversity is a
45. Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (overcoming even strict scru-
tiny to do so). The use of race in any governmental policy or program must be done
pursuant to a compelling state interest. Id. at 227.
46. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I find particularly unanswerable
his central point: that the allegedly 'compelling state interest' at issue here is not the incre-
mental 'educational benefit' that emanates from the fabled 'critical mass' of minority stu-
dents, but . . . Michigan's interest in maintaining a 'prestige' law school whose normal
admissions standards disproportionately exclude ... minorities. If that is a compelling state
interest, everything is.") (internal citations omitted); id. at 328 (deferring primarily to the
institutes of higher learning for a determination of whether diversity is important to their
organizations).
47. Id. at 330 (influencing the Court were amicus briefs from 3M, General Motors
Company, the U.S. Army, and several higher educational institutions).
48. Id. at 330-32 (presenting numerous conflicting ideas in reliance upon the amicus
briefs). Compare id. at 333 ("The Law School does not premise its need for a critical mass
on any belief that minority students always express some characteristic minority viewpoint
on any issue.") (internal quotations omitted), with id. at 333 ("Just as growing up in a
particular region ... is likely to affect an individual's views, so too is one's own unique
experience of being a racial minority in society .... "), and id. at 300 ("[Sltudies show that
student body diversity ... better prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce
and society .... ").
49. Id. at 308, 329.
50. Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
51. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 308, 328.
52. Id. ("Our scrutiny of the interest asserted by the Law School is no less strict for
taking into account complex educational judgments in an area that lies primarily within the
expertise of the university.").




compelling interest,54 and whether the University's policies were nar-
rowly tailored to achieve diversity55 - as was required by Bakke and
Adarand.5 6 Justice O'Connor recognized this flaw and justified the
Court's decision to grant deference to the University by asserting the
University's First Amendment right to "educational autonomy.,
57
Grounded in the First Amendment, this right to educational autonomy
grants universities the right to be free from governmental intrusion when
making academic decisions. 58 The right was first mentioned in Justice
Frankfurter's concurrence in Sweezy v. New Hampshire59 and was again
brought to the forefront in Bakke.6" Educational autonomy was used in
Bakke to justify the right to choose the makeup of a student body.6 ' In
Grutter, educational autonomy served as a basis for deference to universi-
ties in all academic decisions.62 Quoting Justice Powell, Justice O'Connor
reasserted the holding in Bakke that "[t]he freedom of a university to
make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its stu-
dent body,"6 3 and "the right to select those students who will contribute
the most to the robust exchange of ideas. .. seek[s] to achieve a goal that
is of paramount importance in the fulfillment of its mission. '
Thus, the Grutter court weighed a university's First Amendment right
to educational autonomy against the need to scrutinize academic deci-
sions on equal protection grounds, concluding that the right to educa-
54. Id. at 354 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Unlike the majority, I seek to define with
precision the interest being asserted by the Law School before determining whether that
interest is so compelling as to justify racial discrimination.").
55. Id. at 334 (providing mere lip service to the "narrowly tailored" prong of the con-
stitutionality analysis of the admissions policy).
56. Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
57. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329; see also Paul Horowitz, Grutter's First Amendment, 46
B.C. L. REv. 461, 464-65 (2005) (implying the First Amendment right to educational au-
tonomy should not be left unwatched because this empowers universities to regulate
speech, provide biased funding, and reinstitute publicly supported single-sex schools based
on academic grounds).
58. Horowitz, supra note 57.
59. 354 U.S. 234, 262 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (arguing Sweezy, a professor
at the University of New Hampshire, should have escaped conviction for the content of his
class lectures under the right to education autonomy).
60. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312.
61. Id. ("Academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated constitutional
right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment... includ[ing] the
selection of its student body.").
62. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
63. Id. (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978)).
64. Id. (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978)) (in-
ternal quotations omitted) (alterations in original).
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tional autonomy lowers the need for scrutiny65 - although the Court
maintains that strict scrutiny is still the standard.66 Foreseeing the back-
lash of arguments claiming that the Court did not properly scrutinize and
weigh the compelling need for diversity, the Court declared in its own
reasons why diversity is a compelling state interest. Accordingly, the
Court held that diversity is a compelling interest because it: (1) promotes
"cross-racial understanding, '67 (2) helps to "break down racial stereo-
types,I 68 and (3) creates livelier classroom discussions.69 These holdings
somewhat undercut O'Connor's decision to grant the University defer-
ence on the issue of whether diversity is a compelling interest. 70 As one
noted professor questioned, why does the Court, stating it lacks the com-
petence to make "complex educational judgments," give deference to the
University on the issue, but then later "actively endorse[s] the education
benefits of diversity[?] ' '71 Nonetheless, the Court ultimately holds that
"the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body" are a
compelling state interest.72
D. Grutter's Main Problem - What Type of Diversity?
Unfortunately, the cheery picture of diversity painted by the Supreme
Court in Grutter is a mirage. Though clearly acting with good intentions,
the Court did not reach the result it sought to accomplish. Simply put,
the Court wanted universities to enhance classroom diversity by allowing
them to enroll as many different ethnicities as possible. 73 However, Grut-
ter does not create such diversity.
65. Bloom, supra note 14, at 468 (questioning whether the Court has "effectively
dropped the standard of review from strict scrutiny to rational basis review" in instances
where an issue is of educational need).
66. Grutner, 539 U.S. at 326 (stating further that strict scrutiny will be applied to all
racial classifications, as "strict scrutiny is not 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact'") (quoting
Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995)).
67. Id. at 330.
68. Id.
69. Id. (implying a diverse background is best created by the enrollment of racial
minorities).
70. See Bloom, supra note 14, at 467 (explaining that a critical reading of Grutter
shows "an inability or unwillingness [by the Court] to define the state's purported interest
with precision").
71. See Horowitz, supra note 57, at 499.
72. Compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326-30 (2003) (majority opinion)
(stating diversity is itself a compelling interest), with id. at 347-349 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(clarifying his position that a diverse student body was not a compelling interest, but the
educational benefits that flowed from diversity was).
73. Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (majority opinion) (focusing on "race" as the primary factor
for diversity). It is important to note that the Grutter opinion does not prominently men-
tion "ethnicity," but rather focuses on "race" as the primary factor for diversity. The pre-
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Despite the fact that the Court recognized many of the imperfections
of using "race-based" admissions programs (especially how they could
possibly harm those not classified as an underrepresented minority) and
required that race-based admissions programs sunset in approximately
twenty-five years, 4 the Court overlooked the fact that racial classifica-
tions themselves are far too broad to be narrowly tailored to achieve a
diverse student body.7 5 Most notably, the Court failed to consider the
fact that, under the university's classifications of race, several under-
represented ethnicities, such as Arabs,76 would. be harmed by being cap-
tured as a subgroup of the sufficiently represented "Whites" and
"Asians."7 7 This notion is illustrative of the fact that the Court never
questioned whether the policy at issue actually accomplished what the
Court thinks it set out to accomplish. Instead, deference was granted to
the university to determine whether its policy was narrowly tailored to
achieve its goal of diversifying its student body.7" In accepting these
unadjudicated claims, the Supreme Court failed to scrutinize the racial
classifications themselves and allowed an unconstitutional policy to avoid
inspection. If race is used, as it is defined and used by the University of
Michigan Law School,79 it will not produce the diverse student bodies
envisioned by the Court. Further, the Law School's policy cannot be nar-
mise of my argument is that the "racial diversity" that the Court was talking about is better
understood as "ethnic diversity." Race-based classifications do not provide the high-level
of diversity that ethnic-based classification do, because they are overly broad. The factors
of diversity, which the Court emphasized in the opinion, cannot be captured through use of
"race" as the University of Michigan has classified race. I believe the Court sought ethnic
diversity. Section IV, infra, provides a more detailed discussion about the difference be-
tween race and ethnicity.
74. Id. at 342 (majority opinion) (stating its desire that race-based admissions would
no longer be needed to ensure meaningful numbers of minorities in student bodies).
75. See id. at 328 (deciding affirmatively not to review the classifications instead grant-
ing deference to the University and leaving wide open the possibility of limiting its applica-
tion to certain underrepresented minorities).
76. Arabs may or may not be an underrepresented minority. Currently, there is insig-
nificant data available to evaluate this assumption - mostly because universities do not
keep count of Arab students as a separate ethnic group. Thus, Arab-American students
are usually grouped with either "White," "Black," or "Asian" depending on what country
they are from and which race they can ethically choose. For instance, Egyptians will likely
choose African-American, while Afghans may wish to choose Asian or White. The point is
that there is no way of knowing if Arab ethnicity is sufficiently represented unless they are
actually accounted for in a student body.
77. Sarah C. Zearfoss, Admissions of a Director, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 429, 439
n.31 (2003) (explaining that the University of Michigan Law School classifies "Arabs" as
"Whites" in the admissions process).
78. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
79. See Zearfoss, supra note 77.
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rowly tailored to achieve diversity if it intentionally discriminates against
certain underrepresented minority groups.80
The Court, in accepting the university's justification for the need for
diversity, focused on several interests that cannot be accomplished
through the University of Michigan Law School's classifications of race.
Specifically, it can be inferred from the opinion that the Court's defini-
tion of diversity incorporated both physical and mental components.81
The Court envisioned a classroom filled with students that look and think
differently, but also share common ideals.82 The use of over-encompass-
ing and broadly defined "racial" classifications by the Law School does
not promote this diversity.
1. Visible Diversity
The Court stated that the aim of diversity was to breakdown racial ste-
reotypes,83 pointing to the fact that it was looking for something more
than a "characteristic minority viewpoint"' indicates that the Court be-
lieves diversity is accomplished by creating a student body that includes
minorities who are physically and visibly different, but share common
views with majority students.85 The goal is that cross-ethnic understand-
ing will be accomplished when people of different ethnicities see that,
despite their visible differences, they have similar viewpoints. Ultimately,
this shows students that perceived physical, biological, or background dif-
ferences are not indicative of a person's true self.
80. Id. (accordingly and unfortunately, statistics on Arabs and Southeast Asians are
not compiled (or at least not published) by the University of Michigan). Therefore, we do
not even know for certain if such ethnic groups are being actually underrepresented or not.
What is known, however, is that these groups are highly disadvantaged in society either
through discrimination (which is the case for Arabs) or because of economic conditions
(which is the case of Southeast Asians), and thus, it would be expected for them to have
lower representations in universities. Regardless of the lack of statistics, the point still
applies that the University of Michigan cannot possibly narrowly tailor their admissions
policies to achieve minimal discrimination if they do not even recognize the groups which
potential targets of discrimination by their policies.
81. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (explaining ideologies expressed by those who are part of
the "critical mass" create livelier discussions, dissolve stereotypes, and remedy the effects
of past race-based discrimination; preparing students for a marketplace of widely diverse
people, culture, ideologies and viewpoints).
82. See id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 333 (stating the law school did not premise its need for increased minority
enrollment on a specific belief of stereotypical views held by minorities).
85. Bloom, supra note 14, at 472 ("As far as the reader can tell from the Court's
opinion, the educational benefits that result in a compelling state interest flow all but ex-
clusively from racial as opposed to viewpoint-oriented diversity.").
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In accepting this rationale, the Court assumed that students of minority
"races" are visibly different from the students of majority "races." How-
ever, the goal of breaking down racial stereotypes cannot be accom-
plished unless a majority student actually knows she is in the presence of
a minority student. It is utterly incorrect to assume that because a person
is classified as a different race by the archaic racial classifications, they
are necessarily visibly different from majority students. This is not a doc-
umented notion, but rather just common knowledge that certain persons
of each of the underrepresented races (Blacks, Latinos, and Native
Americans) may be "white" in appearance.86 Of course, this is not a rea-
son to deny those students access to affirmative action but, rather, that
these people do not fit into the framework of diversity envisioned by the
Court. After all, as both Justice O'Connor and Justice Powell mentioned,
the use of race-based admissions programs can only be justified through
its benefits to the educational process as a whole, and not on the basis
that it helps the minority student who benefits from affirmative action.
87
Considering these facts, under the first component of Grutter's diver-
sity definition, a person receiving a 'plus' in a race-based admissions pro-
gram should be significantly different in appearance from the average
majority student. Discussed in Section IV below, the University of Michi-
gan's racial classifications lack the precision to separate those people who
are and are not visibly different from the majority within each racial cate-
gory. Thus, on the first component of diversity, the Law School's race-
based admissions program is not narrowly tailored to achieve a student
body that has visibly different students with similar viewpoints.
2. Viewpoint Diversity
Despite apparently relying on visible differences as the benchmark for
achieving a diverse student body, the Court proceeded to imply that there
is also a mental or viewpoint component to diversity.88 Specifically, the
opinion points to amicus briefs from several United States companies
86. The criterion for determining what constitutes "white appearance" is, obviously,
subjective. A discussion on the topic is beyond the scope of this note. However, I do not
believe that it would be an unreasonable stretch to state that Mariah Carey, Ricky Martin,
and Val Kilmer who are, under the University of Michigan's definitions, Black, Hispanic,
and Native American, respectively, are "white" in appearance.
87. See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 316 (2003) ("[T]he policy seeks to
guide admissions officers in 'producing classes both diverse and academically outstanding
.... '); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 267 (1978) ("[T]he goal of
achieving a diverse student body is sufficiently compelling to justify consideration of race
in admissions decisions under some circumstances .... ").
88. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330-31 (developing the idea that marketability requires
exposure to other's ideas and viewpoints).
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which state that "the skills needed in today's increasingly global market-
place" 9 can only be attained by being part of a diverse student body.9"
In summarizing these briefs, Justice O'Connor opines that a diverse stu-
dent body is important to education, in general, because it gives students
"exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints.""
Although, this position somewhat contradicts the opinion's later conclu-
sion,92 it shows that the Court's awareness of traditional viewpoints asso-
ciated with certain minority groups are also an important aspect of
creating a "diverse" student body.9 3 Unfortunately, this position is prob-
lematic on two grounds. First, it assumes that stereotypical viewpoints
exist amongst "racial" groups. Second, in order for the first assumption
to be correct, it must also be assumed that the "racial" groups utilized by
the Law School are so similar that the entire group likely shares in the
stereotypical viewpoint. Because this assumption ignores the inherent di-
versity amongst sub-groups in each of the university's racial classifica-
tions,94 the opinion contains a second major flaw and allows for the
existence of University of Michigan's still-unconstitutional admissions
program.
Viewed in the aggregate, the visible/physical and viewpoint/mental ele-
ments of the Court's "diversity" create an interesting and complex set of
characteristics that dictate whether or not a person will diversify a univer-
sity's student body. Based on Grutter, the most diversifying minority is
one who (1) is very much different in appearance than majority stu-
89. Id.
90. See Brief for 65 Leading American Businesses as Amicus Curiae Supporting Re-
spondents at 5-8, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 399056
(listing four distinct characteristics possessed exclusively by those who are educated in a
diverse environment); Brief for General Motors Corp. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Re-
spondents at 3-5, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 399096
(arguing academic institutions are charged with preparing future business leaders with es-
sential skills in dealing cross-culturally; further, students acquire this competence when the
academic environment is multicultural and multiracial).
91. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (citing Brief for 65 Leading American Businesses as Ami-
cus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 5-8, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No.
02-241), 2003 WL 399056).
92. Id. at 333 (discussing that a diverse student body does not require characteristic
minority viewpoints).
93. Id. ("[A] 'critical mass' of underrepresented minorities is necessary to further [the
Law School's] compelling interest in securing the education benefits of a diverse student
body.").
94. See id. at 375 n.2 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("A relative preference awarded
to a black applicant over, for example, a similarly situated Native American applicant, does
not lead to the enrollment of even one more underrepresented minority student, but only
balances the races within the critical mass.") (internal quotations omitted) (arguing a sys-




dents,95 (2) is similar to majority students,96 and (3) also shares in some
stereotypical minority viewpoint.97 Further, the least diversifying minor-
ity is one who (1) has a "white" appearance and (2) does not share in any
stereotypical minority viewpoints. A narrowly tailored race-based admis-
sions program 98 must take into account this range of diversity if it is to be
the least intrusive means to ensure diversity. 99 The Law School's pro-
gram does not take into account these crucial diversity factors' 00 and is
not, therefore, the least intrusive means of accomplishing the diversity
accepted by the Court.10 1 Thus, if the Court would have scrutinized the
University's racial classifications, it would have found that under Justice
O'Connor's rationale in Grutter, the Law School's admissions program
should have been rejected as not narrowly tailored to achieve the diver-
sity envisioned by the Court.10 2
E. The State of the Law
Before detailing why the racial classifications used by the University of
Michigan are, themselves, unconstitutional, it is necessary to summarize
the current state of affirmative action in higher education since Grut-
ter.'0 3 First, a university may consider the applicants' race as a "plus"
95. Id. at 381-83 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (distinguishing persons who are admit-
ted solely because of designations such as Native American, African American, Caucasian,
etc.).
96. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 313 (2003) (majority opinion) (finding both
minorities and non-minorities needed to be the most capable and academically qualified
students).
97. Id. at 329 (majority opinion) (finding students from a minority background "will
contribute the most to the robust exchange of ideas").
98. Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) ("[S]uch classifications are
constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling govern-
mental interests.").
99. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 313 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("[R]espondents must
demonstrate that their methods of using race 'fit' a compelling state interest with greater
precision than any alternative means.") (internal quotations omitted) (arguing the proce-
dures used by the University of Michigan Law School fail to meet the narrowly tailored
requirement of strict scrutiny).
100. Id. at 306 (majority opinion) (recognizing the greater definition of diversity in-
cludes aspects other than race, but stating that race is a factor of special reference for
enrollment).
101. Id. at 379 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("Stripped of its "critical mass" veil, the
Law School's program is revealed as a naked effort to achieve racial balancing.") (explain-
ing an admissions program that is narrowly tailored would take into account factors en-
hancing one's diversity, other than race).
102. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("I do not believe, however, that the University
of Michigan Law School's ... means are narrowly tailored to the interest it asserts.").
103. Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (majority opinion).
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factor in determining whether a minority candidate should be admitted10 4
because the educational benefits that flow from diversity are a compelling
state interest.1"5 Second, universities may attempt to achieve a "critical
mass" of minority students to ensure that they do not experience isolation
or feel as if they are a representative of their race. 0 6 Third, in order to
accomplish these goals, however, a university must narrowly tailor its
program to take into account all relevant diversifying factors, and make
the application process individualized to every applicant.10 7 Fourth, uni-
versities must consider race-neutral alternatives prior to implementing a
race-conscious policy,108 though the university need not sacrifice its aca-
demic reputation.10 9 Finally, universities have been awarded a great deal
of deference in forming their admissions policies, and, in the absence of
bad faith on the part of the university, the Supreme Court vowed to re-
frain from interference in academic judgments.11
IV. RACE: AN IMPRESSION SELF-IDENTIFIER
A. Good Faith Does Not Alleviate Impermissible Discrimination
The Court's deference to the University of Michigan was based upon a
key assumption in Grutter.1 That is, the Court assumed the university
was acting in good faith in determining whether diversity is compelling
and whether it was created through the least discriminatory methods.
1 1 2
Further, the Court assumed that good faith would cure the improper dis-
criminatory element of affirmative action policies.1 3
Unfortunately, the Court did not take into account the fact that the
university could act in good faith in constructing its race-based admis-
104. Id. at 330-31, 341 (explaining that programs seeking to promote diversity of the
student body must not use race as the exclusive factor in evaluations).
105. Id. at 328 (relying primarily upon the arguments made in the amicus briefs).
106. Id. at 319.
107. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317-18 (1978) (discussing
that the applicant who loses his seat will not have a Fourteenth Amendment claim if the
candidates were evaluated using qualities such as "exceptional personal talents, unique
work or service experience, leadership potential, maturity, demonstrated compassion.., or
other qualifications deemed important").
108. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340 (considering whether the Law School attempted
race-neutral policies prior to a race-based to establish a "critical mass" of minority
students).
109. Id. (stating the Law School need not attempt a lottery system as a race-neutral
program for acceptance because such a sacrifice of academic integrity would be too great).
110. See id. at 328.
111. Grutter, 539 U.S. 306.
112. See id. at 328-29 ("'[G]ood faith' is 'presumed' absent 'a showing to the con-
trary."') (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318-19 (1978)).
113. See id. at 329.
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sions program, but still not create a constitutionally permissible pro-
gram.114 Even policies that do not cause intentional racial discrimination
can be unconstitutional under true strict scrutiny analysis.1 15 The Univer-
sity of Michigan Law School's admissions policies fit this category.
In sum, the Law School's race-based admissions policies are intention-
ally and permissibly discriminatory towards whites and sufficiently repre-
sented minorities, but, more importantly, the policies have an
unanticipated and impermissibly discriminatory effect on many under-
represented minorities, such as Arabs and Southeast Asians. Such minor-
ities may never reach a critical mass if universities continue to use
obsolete racial classifications. Thus, current racial classifications work
against the goal of diversity because they provide admissions staffs with
imprecise and incorrect data regarding the identity of applicants.
The next section of this articles will discuss the various harms caused by
the use of poorly defined racial classifications in admissions, beginning
first with an examination of what "race" is for legal and policy-related
purposes.
B. What Is Race?
Posing and then trying to answer the question "what is race?" in a legal
paper may seem somewhat absurd. Most people already have a general
understanding of what race is, at least at a basic level. However, when it
becomes necessary to define race for the purpose of classifying people in
public policy, a general understanding does not suffice. Moreover, this
article advocates a shift away from less-precise classifications of race in
favor of more precise ethnic classifications. Since many (if not most) peo-
ple use the two terms interchangeably, it is imperative to define and dif-
ferentiate the two concepts before making judgments or arguments.
1. Race - Defined
Merriam-Webster's Dictionary defines "race" as "a family, tribe, peo-
ple, or nation belonging to the same stock ... a class or kind of people
unified by shared interests, habits, or characteristics ... category of hu-
mankind that shares certain distinctive physical traits."'1 16 The Encyclo-
114. See id. at 383 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("[T]he percentage of the admitted
applicants who are [minorities] [are] far too precise to be dismissed as merely the result of
the school 'paying some attention to [the] numbers."') (some alterations in original) (hint-
ing at possible 'bad faith' because the University of Michigan Law School had suspiciously
admitted approximately the same percentage of minorities that applied every year for the
past twenty years, raising questions about an underlying quota for minorities).
115. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (striking down an
unintentional policy as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
116. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1024 (11th ed. 2003).
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pedia Britannica explains that race, today, is "primarily a sociological
designation, identifying a class sharing some outward physical character-
istics and some commonalities of culture and history." '' These two
sources are mere illustrations of the varying definitions one would en-
counter when asking the question "what is race?" Race was originally
thought to be an immutable biological characteristic by Europeans'1a set
of behavioral and physical traits biologically and genetically associated
with a group of people.1 19 This theory has since been disproved through
modern anthropological and genetic studies which demonstrate that race
is actually not a biological feature, 2 ° but rather an artificial sociological
designation used to identify a class or group sharing similar physical or
cultural characteristics. 121 In other words, a "black" person's descend-
ants may become "white" as it is defined today, through select breeding
choices of the descendants - contrary to the early European view.
12 2
This artificiality is significant to affirmative action because, if the classifi-
cations are not absolute and can change to encompass more diversity,
universities that strive to diversify their student body should move away
from the old racial classifications. A historical examination of the devel-
opment of the concept of race will illustrate how the racial classifications
that the University of Michigan uses are not set in stone and should be
disposed of in favor of more accurate ethnic descriptors.
2. The Historical Development of "Race"
The concept of "race" can be traced back to Ancient Greece and Aris-
totle's doctrine of "Predicables of Genus, Species, Difference, Property,
and Accident. '1 23 Race, at that time, was a concept of convenience used
to explain diversity among the human species.12 4 For the next several
centuries, the common belief was that the different races that existed in
the world were entirely different species of man.1 25 Franqois Bernier is
widely acknowledged as the first author to use "race" to classify human
117. ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE, supra note 4 (search "race and ethnicity").
118. Id. (identifying one by race according to physical traits and behavior transmitted
by generations of persons).
119. Id. (specifically identifying one by "skin color, head shape, and hair texture").
120. Id. (accepting the view that rather than race being biological, it is likely influ-
enced by differences in geographic location).
121. Id.
122. ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE, supra note 4 (search "race and ethnicity")
(explaining studies have determined all groups of persons are "thoroughly mixed" geneti-
cally, and thus race does not exist on a biological level).
123. MONTAGU, supra note 1, at 3.
124. Id.
125. Id. (discussing that during the mid-1700s, race was used to distinguish between
the "six groups of man").
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variety according to physiognomy and skin color.' 26 Without ever distin-
guishing race from species, in his 1684 essay A New Division of the Earth,
Bernier divided humans into four groups: Europeans (including South
Asians and Native Americans), Far Easterners, Sub-Saharan Africans,
and Lapps (the indigenous people of Scandinavia).127 The first direct ref-
erence to race can be traced back to 1735, when Carolus Linnaeus, the
father of scientific classification, took the Class, Species, and Genus con-
cepts from theologians and used them as systematic tools. 128 Yet it was
not until 1749 when the first literary definition of race was written by
heralded French scientist Georges-Louis Leclerc Comte de Buffon.129
Finally in 1775, the human species was first scientifically divided into
races by Johann Blumenbach. 130 Blumenbach separated humans into
Caucasians/whites, Mongolians/yellows, Malayans/browns, Negros/blacks,
and Americans/reds, based on the size of their skulls.13 ' The
Blumenbach classifications eventually evolved into Caucasoid, Mongo-
loid, and Negroid 32 in the nineteenth century, after scientists found little
difference between Blumenbach's Malays, Mongolians, and Americans
(which became Mongoloids, collectively).133 Thus, the prevalent view
heading into the twentieth century was that the human species was com-
prised of three main biologically determined races - Caucasoids, Neg-
roids, and Mongoloids - with a few varieties of smaller sub-races.13 4
3. Modern View of Race
The views stated above have since been discredited scientifically. As
early as 1784, many scientists had already rejected the notion that distinct
races exist in a biological sense. 135 Unfortunately, modern racial classifi-
cations seem to be based upon these erroneous, and often racist, views of
the eighteenth and nineteenth century scientists. The idea that race was
126. Franqois Bernier, A New Division of the Earth, J. DES SCAVANS (1684) (trans-
lated by T. Bendyshe, Memoirs Read Before the Anthropological Society of London) (sep-
arating man into four or five species based primarily upon skin color).
127. Id.
128. MONTAGU, supra note 1, at 123.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2 (recognizing the potential for problems with the use of race, he recom-
mended its use for convenience only).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 174.
133. MONTAGU, supra note 1, at 174.
134. Id. U.S. anthropologist Carleton Coon added two additional races Australoid and
Capoid to the three existing races to create the prevalent view of the early 20th century.
Id. However, Coon has been widely discredited as being a racist. Id.
135. Id. at 2.
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biologically determined remained popular for decades after and is still a
common misconception in modern society.
Today, it is generally accepted by most biologists that race does not
exist from a biological standpoint,' 3 6 and it has no biological status.'37
There is simply not enough genetic diversity between any two people in
the world to distinguish them biologically the way you could for other
species.138 The distinctions between the five "classic races" occurred as a
result of Homo sapien mutation, selection, adaptation, migration, and iso-
lation of humans as they spread out across the globe.' 39 Descendants of
the Early Man "developed different skin colours and other traits which,
over a long period of time, became the racial characteristics we see to-
day."14 In other words, the diversity we see today, and often call race, is
not the result of Africans, Asians, or Caucasians descending from differ-
ent species. 14' Rather, most biologists now are in agreement that all
humans came from one common Homo sapien ancestor, and that the di-
versity that we see amongst humans is the result of adaptation to environ-
mental stimulus by certain groups of people migrating away from the
central population and inbreeding.142 In fact, Dr. Alan Templeton, a bi-
ology professor at Washington University in St. Louis, discovered that,
genetically, people are much more similar based on their geographic loca-
tion than based on their physical appearance. 143 Nearly every trait asso-
ciated with a race can be linked to an environmental stimulus. 4 4 For
136. See David L. Wheeler, A Growing Number of Scientists Reject the Concept of
Race, 1995 CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. 1 ("[R]ace is a myth [and] scientifically outmoded way
of classifying people.").
137. MADAN SARUP, IDENTITY, CULTURE, AND POSTMODERN WORLD 171 (1998).
138. ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE, supra note 4 (explaining genes are "thor-
oughly mixed" and are not distinguishable by race).
139. UNITED NATIONS EDUC., SCIENTIFIC & CULTURAL ORG., WHAT Is RACE? Evi-
DENCE FROM SCIENTISTS 10 (1952) (speculating that all homo sapiens evolved from one
cell, named from the places they are found).
140. Id. at 13.
141. Id. at 11 ("[A]II men living today belong to one single species, Homo sapien, and
are derived from a common stock.").
142. Id. at 12 (basing this view upon the bone structure, internal organs, and nervous
system which are all similarly shared by all human beings).
143. Tony Fitzpatrick, Evolutionary Biologist. Race in Humans a Social, Not Biologi-
cal, Concept, WASH. UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS NEWS & INFO. 1 (May 30, 2003) [hereinafter
Evolutionary Biologist], http://news-info.wustl.edu/tips/page/normal/184.html (statement of
Dr. Templeton) ("[L]et's say you have a person from Micronesia who needs a transplant.
These are people who have dark skin and resemble western Africans. Yet genetically the
Micronesian is closer to a European than he is to an African .... [S]kin color here is not a
reliable indicator .... It's actually more important to find out a geographical ancestry than
a donor's skin color.").
144. See Lecture Notes: What is Anthropology, http://www.unm.edu/-oberling/
modhumbi.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2006).
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example, dark skin is attributed not to being African, Indian, or Austra-
lian, but because proximity to the equator and hot climates causes skin to
darken, and over time dark skin will become a dominant trait in that
group's gene pool.'4 5
Fortunately, the world has made significant progress in recognizing that
people do not exist in three to five simple and discrete races.146 Yet for
some reason, most Americans continue to acquiesce to being classified by
an archaic five-race standard. The standard has been engrained in peo-
ple's minds so strongly that it is nearly impossible to do away with it with-
out completely re-educating the entire world on the recent race-related
scientific findings that prove that three to five distinct races do not ex-
ist.1 47 This relates to the Court's analysis in Grutter148 because it does not
seem as though the Supreme Court took into consideration the meaning
of race and racial diversity when the case was decided. The fact that race
and ethnicity has been used in tandem or interchangeably by the Univer-
sity in its briefs, court filings, and, most importantly, its documented ad-
missions policy 149 indicates that the University equates the two as a
unitary concept, and, while they may be striving for quantifiable ethnic
diversity, they are accomplishing some sort of arbitrary "racial"
diversity.' 50
The subsequent section of this article will discuss the legal concept and
basis behind the racial classifications used by the University of Michigan.
C. The Legal Concept of Race
Race, as discussed in previous sections of this article, is not only an
important anthropological and social concept;151 it is also an extremely
important legal concept.1 52 Race was mentioned or alluded to in some of
145. See UNITED NATIONS EDuc., supra note 139, at 13 (indicating the geographical
migration has affected the skin color variations created after the homo sapiens origin from
Early Man); Lecture Notes, supra note 144.
146. See, e.g., MONTAGU, supra note 1, at 62 (standing for the proposition that the
term race is obsolete).
147. See id. at 60-70 (1963) (discussing the problem with the misuse of the term race,
when the word ethnic group is correct, since there is no such thing as race).
148. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
149. DON HERZOG ET AL., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
MICHIGAN ADMISSIONS COMMITrEE (1992), available at http://www.umich.edu/new-
sandinfo/lawsuit/admissionspolicy.pdf.
150. Id. (outlining a commitment to "racial" and "ethnic" diversity in the student
body, specifically of three "races" who would not otherwise be represented adequately in
the student body, and who likely have special experiences and perspectives).
151. MONTAGU, supra note 1, at 60-65.
152. HERZOG ET AL., supra note 149 (showing when the Court is not accurate in its
use of "race" the result is misuse of "race" to create diversity in admissions programs).
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the United States' first legal documents, including the Constitution,153
and has been used in policy decisions throughout the nation's existence.
The first races recognized by the federal government were "[wihites,"
"American Indians," and "[s]laves," as categorized by the 1790 United
States Census Bureau.1 54 The mass influx of immigrants throughout the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries caused subsequent censuses to include
new classifications that took into account nationalities, ethnicities, and
religion.1 55 In fact, throughout this time, the United States changed its
racial categories in nearly every census. Since 1900, twenty-six different
racial categories have been used in various censuses, including Hindus
(religions), South, East, and Central Europeans (ethnicities), and Italians
and Irish (nationalities).15 6 It is difficult to understand that, despite expo-
nential increases in immigration and interracial marriages, agencies and
institutions actually use fewer racial designations in classifying people
than they did the 1950s and 60s.
Until the 1960s, exact or uniform racial distinctions and categories were
not all that important to the federal government. Racial classifications
were used initially as a means to discriminate and divide populations in
the United States. 157 When racial classifications are used to arbitrarily
discriminate, clear definitions are not required. However, after the civil
rights movement of the 1960s and the development of federal affirmative
action programs, the need for standard racial classifications became es-
sential to the success of race-based government programs.158 Thus, in
1975, after several years of confusion over who qualified for race-based
government assistance, the Federal Interagency Commission on Educa-
tion ("FICE") formed an Ad Hoc Committee on Racial and Ethnic Defi-
153. See U.S. CONST. art. I § 2 cl. 3 (stating that slaves count as three-fifths of a person
for purposes of apportioning votes).
154. JUANITA TAMAYO LoTr, ASIAN AMERICANS: FROM RACIAL CATEGORY TO
MULTIPLE IDENTITIES 17 (1997) (analyzing the origins of group classification in the United
States).
155. Id. at 18.
156. See Campbell Gibson & Kay Jung, Historical Census Statistics On Population
Totals By Race, 1790 to 1990, and By Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, For Large Cities And
Other Urban Places In The United States (U.S. Census Bureau, Working Paper No. 76,
2005).
157. See TAMAYO, supra note 154 (using race to exclude persons from full
citizenship).
158. Id. at 32. For instance, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 required racial identifica-
tion of persons within specific geographic locations to determine whether voting discrimi-
nation was occurring. Id. Further, several of the government agencies that utilized race-
based programs to combat past discriminations did not even have policies, standards, or
methods to collect racial data. Id. Among these agencies were the Department of Trans-
portation and the Veterans Administration. Id.
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nitions ("Committee"). 5 9 The Committee's purpose was to develop "an
integrated scheme of terms and definitions, conceptually sound, which
can be applied to cover major categories of race and ethnicity and can be
used by all agencies to help meet their particular data requirements."1 6
The five original categories proposed by the FICE were "American In-
dian or Alaskan Native, Asian or Pacific Islander, Black/Negro, Cauca-
sian/White, and Hispanic." '161 The Committee considered other
categories but passed upon the chance to expand, in favor of brevity and
simplicity.1 62 For example, having an "Other" category was contem-
plated but ultimately rejected because most committee members believed
that it would complicate surveys.1 63 Also, the committee decided a cate-
gory for Asian Indians was unnecessary because they were close enough
to Caucasians that they could (and would have to) choose "white" as
their race.164 And so, after thorough discussion and debate through the
Ad Hoc Committee, FICE developed America's first standards for classi-
fying races, and recommended that the Office of Management and
Budget ("OMB") promulgate these categories as the standard for all fed-
eral agencies. 165 These FICE standards ended up becoming the ancestor
to all other governmental racial classifications that have followed. 166
1. Directive 15
In 1978, the OMB released Statistical Directive 15, "Race and Ethnic
Standards for Federal Statistics and Administrative Reporting" ("Direc-
tive 15",).167 The purpose of Directive 15 was to collect and use "compati-
159. See id. at 38.
160. Id. 38-39 (citing Fed'l Interagency Comm. on Educ. 20 (1975)).
161. Compare id. at 38, with HERZOG ET AL., supra note 149; Law School Admissions
Council, http://www.lsac.org (comparing the "races" created by the Federal Interagency
Committee on Education and the University of Michigan Law School and the Law School
Admissions Council).
162. TAMAYO Lorr, supra note 154, at 39.
163. Id. (citing Federal Fed'l Interagency Comm. on Educ. 11-12 (1975)).
164. Id. at 39-40 (citing Fed'l Interagency Comm. on Educ. 20 (1975)) (deciding the
regionalized discrimination against Asian Americans dispelled the need to protect them
through categorization).
165. Id. at 39 (announcing the creation of an "integrated scheme of terms and defini-
tions, conceptually sound which [could] be applied to cover major categories of race and
ethnicity and can be used by all agencies to help meet their particular date requirements"
(quoting Fed'l Interagency Comm. on Educ. 20 (1975))).
166. Id. at 45 (stating the OMB continued using the four categories of race, with few
minor alterations, including the addition of the "other" category).
167. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, RACE
AND ETHNIC STANDARDS FOR FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE REPORTING, Stat. Dir. No. 15,
43 Fed. Reg. 19, 87 (May 4, 1978) [hereinafter STANDARDS FOR FEDERAL ADMINISTRA-
TIVE REPORTING], http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/fedreg/directive-15.html; See, e.g., 66
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ble, non-duplicated, exchangeable racial and ethnic data by Federal
agencies. ,168 What was essentially created to dictate the use of race in
federal agencies has been used to provide standards in affirmative action
programs. 169 Thus, Directive 15 is critical to the analysis of Grutter,17 °
because the Law School's racial classifications descended from Directive
15.171
In establishing Directive 15, the OMB adopted the FICE recom-
mended classifications with the following changes: (1) the terms "Cauca-
sian" and "Negro" were dropped and (2) Asian Indians were moved from
the "Whites" category to the "Asians" category after persuasive lobbying
from Association of Indians in America. 172 This initial version of Direc-
tive 15, however, was severely flawed because it lacked the complexity to
encompass the new demographics of 1980s America. First, Directive 15
lacked clear definitions for each of its racial groups and so several of the
newer ethnic populations in the United States simply did not know to
which race they belonged. 173 Second, it did not take into account the
large multi-racial populations that emerged in the 1980s; there was no
multi-racial or bi-racial category.17 ' Third, as one analyst noted, the Di-
rective 15 racial classifications contained "significant problems in their
construction and meaning" because of their lack of uniformity.'7 5 Specif-
ically, White and Asian classifications are defined by location of ances-
tors, Native Americans are defined by "affiliation or community
recognition, ,17' Hispanics are defined by culture, and Blacks are defined
Fed. Reg. 12923 (Mar. 1, 2001) (reciting the Office of Management and Budget is a body
within the Executive Branch, with the primary task of coordinating federal agencies; and
accordingly it is their duty to create standards for racial identification classifications).
168. TAMAYO Lor-r, supra note 154, at 40 (explaining the OMB's intention that Di-
rective 15 be the guidelines by which all governmental policies, programs, agencies, institu-
tions, and organs followed when defining or using race).
169. Michael Omi, Racial Identity and the State: The Dilemmas of Classification, 15
LAW & INEQ. 7, 21 (1997).
170. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
171. See Omi, supra note 169 (arguing that although Directive 15 was originally con-
ceived solely for the use of federal agencies, it has since become the de facto standard for
racial classifications used for (1) both state and local agencies, (2) private and nonprofit
use, (3) and researchers).
172. TAMAYO LoTr, supra note 154, at 45 (1997)
173. Id. (adding "other" to the racial categories to 1988 census seemed to be a quick,
but ineffective way to fix the problem of not belonging to one of the listed categories).
174. Gibson & Jung, supra note 156 (suggesting the problem of not fitting neatly into
one category of race continues today and has been remedied by the possibility of listing
two races, instead of one on the recent censuses).
175. Omi, supra note 169, at 1 (explaining that one's race was based on non-uniform
criteria including racial, cultural, and geographical affiliations).
176. STANDARDS FOR FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE REPORTING, supra note 167; See
Omi, supra note 169.
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through a circular definition that classifies them as people who have an-
cestors of "the black racial groups of Africa."' 7 7
In 1988, the OMB revised Directive 15 in an attempt to temper confu-
sion and address the flaws of the previous version. 178 Unfortunately, the
revision did not help much. "Other" was added as an additional racial
category, but still no clear definitions were provided, and a mixed - race
category was rejected because the OMB felt that it was necessary for peo-
ple to choose one of the original categories in order to enforce civil rights
programs. 179 Despite these flaws in the Directive 15 classifications, the
standards were increasingly used throughout the 1980s and 1990s by
"state and local government agencies, marketing firms, private industry,
and the nonprofit sectors[,]" as well as by universities.' 80
2. Significance of Directive 15 to the Grutter Analysis
The United States government conceded in its 1997 revision of Direc-
tive 15 that "the [old] standards ... do not reflect the increasing diversity
of our Nation's population that has resulted primarily from growth in im-
migration and in interracial marriages.' 81 In an attempt to cure the in-
adequacies, the OMB re-examined Directive 15 with new census data and
came to the conclusion that the six racial categories being used were the
''minimum set of categories" to be used when collecting data on race and
ethnicity.' 8 2 Further, the OMB urged users of racial data to expand on
the standard classifications to fit their particular geographic area or field
of interest.' 18 3 Finally, in 2003, the OMB once again called for a commit-
tee to reassess the categories, as the number of "write-in" races was be-
coming much too large and unmanageable.184 The group with the most
"write-ins" was Arabs/Middle Easterners. 185 Although Arabs/Middle
177. Id.; see Omi, supra note 169 at 11.
178. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, RACE
AND ETHNIC STANDARDS FOR FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE REPORTING, Stat. Dir. No. 15,
51 Fed. Reg. 12 (Jan. 20, 1988); TAMAYO LOTr, supra note 154, at 44.
179. TAMAYO LoTr, supra note 154, at 45-46.
180. See, e.g., id. at 47.
181. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, RACE
AND ETHNIC STANDARDS FOR FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE REPORTING, Stat. Dir. No. 15,
59 Fed. Reg. 29831-29835 (June 9, 1994).
182. Id.
183. Id. (suggesting that these institutions make comments to the OMB staff and sug-
gest possible changes).
184. Id.; see Gibson & Jung, supra note 156.
185. G. PATRICIA DE LA CRUZ & ANGELA BRITrINGHAM, U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, CENSUS 2000 BRIEF: THE ARAB POPULATION: 2000 (2003), available at http//www.
census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-23.pdf (stating prior to the 2000 Census, 600,000 people
chose to write in "Arab" as their race).
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Easterners were already considered to be separate from Whites, Blacks,
and Asians by most citizens, the government failed to recognize the
distinction. 186
And so, the University of Michigan, which has adopted racial classifica-
tions for its race-based admissions program in conformity with Directive
15, employs flawed standards that have been criticized by the agency in
charge of its promulgation.187 As the OMB stated in its 2001 revision to
Directive 15, the old classifications are bare minimums and should be uti-
lized only in view of the demographics to which they apply."88 Universi-
ties receive applications from all over the country and from all types of
people. There is no government actor that the OMB's recommendation
for expanded classifications applies to more than to universities. Since
this is the case, and since the OMB has recommended that institutions
using Directive 15 classifications expand upon them (essentially stating
that current classifications are not narrowly tailored to defining current
United States demographics), universities must take positive steps to
move away from the old standards and towards more narrow and precise
classifications. A change to ethnic data will cure the imprecision and nar-
rowly tailor the admissions program to avoid discrimination of unac-
counted minorities.
D. Ethnicity
Ethnicity is also a concept that is difficult to define. Webster's Diction-
ary defines "ethnic" as "a member of a minority or nationality .. .as
distinguished by customs, characteristics, language, etc." '18 9 Encyclopedia
Britannica defines an "ethnic group" as "a social group or category of the
population that, in a larger society, is set apart and bound together by
common ties, including language, nationality, culture, perceived 'racial'
characteristics, and a shared history."' 90 Some claim ethnicity is "the
shared, cultural, historical features of a group[,]" and is based upon
"identification with a group conscious of its language, religion, history,
186. Id.; see Zearfoss, supra note 77 (stating Arabs were commonly not listed as a
separate category of race in admissions policies).
187. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, RECOM-
MENDATIONS FROM THE INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE FOR THE REVIEW OF THE RACIAL AND
ETHNIC STANDARDS TO THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET CONCERNING
CHANGES TO THE STANDARDS FOR THE CLASSIFICATION OF FEDERAL DATA ON RACE
AND ETHNICITY (1997), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/fedreg/directive_15.
html.
188. Id. (encouraging the use of more detailed categories of racial and ethnic classifi-
cations than set forth in Directive 15).
189. NOAH WEBSTER, WEBSTER'S DELUXE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 628 (2d ed.
2003).
190. ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE, supra note 4 (search "race and ethnicity").
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tradition and ways of life."' 9 1 Finally, an ethnic group has been defined
as "one of a number of populations, . . . which ... maintain their differ-
ences, physical[ly] and cultural[ly] by means of isolating mechanisms such
as geographic and social barriers.' 192 Common amongst most of these
definitions are culture and association - as opposed to predisposition. 93
So how is ethnicity different than race? As famed demographer
Juanita Tamayo Lott noted, the interaction of race and ethnicity is so in-
tertwined and conflated that "[w]ithin the United States, the terms na-
tionality, race, and ethnicity may be overlapping . ".. 194 Participants in
an international conference on ethnic or racial classifications revealed
that some counties view "race as a dimension of ethnicity[,] while others
mentioned ethnicity within the context of race."1 95 Thus, the line be-
tween ethnicity and race is probably very fine in the eyes of most Ameri-
cans. 196 Yet, there is a very important difference between race and
ethnicity. 197
In the United States, ethnicity is a more "voluntary" concept than
race.1 98 Ethnicity is determined more through first person identification,
whereas race is often determined by third person identification.' 99 As
Professor Lott explains,
[r]ace has been used to distinguish a White majority from a minority
composed primarily of people of color. It has been imposed by the
majority group. Ethnicity has been used mainly to describe White
ethnics and is a form of self-definition not necessarily related to or
based on a majority group.2 °°
With ethnicity, the focus is less on biological features and more on cul-
tural aspects that often take into account biological and physical fea-
191. SARUP, supra note 137, at 178.
192. MONTAGU, supra note 1, at 66-67.
193. Id. at 69.
194. TAMAYO LOTr, supra note 154, at 26.
195. Id. at 25-26.
196. Id.
197. MONTAGU, supra note 1, at 68-70 ("The advantages of the phrase 'ethnic group'
are: first, while emphasizing the fact that one is dealing with a distinguishing group, this
noncommittal phrase leaves the whole question of the precise status of the group on physi-
cal and other grounds open for further discussion and research; second, it recognizes the
fact that it is a group which has been subject to the action of cultural influences; and third,
it eliminates all obfuscating emotional implications.").
198. Id. at 67.
199. Id. at 66 (allowing those who are defined by ethnic group, rather than race, to
explain themselves instead of the questioner applying their predetermined racial
stereotype).
200. TAMAYO LOTT, supra note 154, at 26.
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tures. 20 1 Further, ethnic groups can be formed on varying grounds
depending on geographic location.2 °2 For instance, "in Canada, the focus
is on ancestry, reflecting the immigrant origins of most Canadians. In
Malaysia, as well as in India, and Indonesia, religion, language, and caste
are definitive features .... Hispanic America and the Caribbean focus on
language and culture. ''2 13 Thus, ethnicity is a less rigid classification than
race that employs an amalgamation of culture, language, religion, nation-
ality, and physical features in determining how groups of people are dif-
ferent from each other.20 4
1. Why Is ethnicity a Better Indicator of Diversity?
Ethnicity is a better indicator of diversity than race for several reasons.
First, the concept of race has negative connotations attached to it.205 His-
torically, race was used or was a motive to commit some of the most hei-
nous atrocities the world has ever seen.20 6 The modem view on ethnicity
is that "[c]ompared to the term 'race,' 'ethnicity' is often used as a more
neutral or even positive term., 2 7 Noted anthropologist Dr. Ashley
Montagu argued for the disposal of racial classifications in favor of ethnic
classifications as early as 1963.208 Montagu warned that racial classifica-
tions tend to incite emotional responses because of the way they were
originally introduced.20 9 Montagu also argues that race is inherently con-
fusing - no one knows what it means.210 Ethnicity, on the other hand, is
non-committal and does not have the general negative connotations asso-
ciated with race.2 n In other words, ethnicity does not have the same dis-
turbing undertones as race and is more flexible in its usage.212
However, more important to affirmative action issues, strict scrutiny
analysis, and the Grutter case, is the fact that ethnicity is much more pre-
cise concept than race. As discussed above, classical racial classifications
201. MONTAGU, supra note 1, at 67.
202. Id.
203. TAMAYO LOTrT, supra note 154, at 25.
204. See id. at 25-26; MONTAGU, supra note 1, at 70.
205. BARBARA D. MILLER, CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 22 (1999) (reminding those
who use hear the term "race" of the actions performed of historical suppression or elimina-
tion of certain "races").
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. MONTAGU, supra note 1, at 61-70.
209. Id. at 64.
210. Id. at 61-62.
211. Id. at 66 (suggesting the term ethnicity leaves an open definition, whereas race
results in the application one's own schemas or stereotypes towards that race).
212. Id. at 69-70 (arguing that ethnicity can be applied to any group that has distinct
physical and cultural traits).
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do not accommodate vast intraracial diversity. British anthropologist
Madan Sarup expressed it best when he wrote "the term 'black' is reduc-
tionist, it reduces people with many different cultures to one flat cate-
gory."2 3  Using these "reductionist" categories, the Law School's
admissions policies cannot be narrowly tailored to achieving diversity, es-
pecially when it groups several underrepresented ethnic groups within
larger racial groups.21 4
2. Race or Ethnicity - Does it Matter?
As it has been stated for decades now, racial issues are no longer black
and white.2 15 The number of interracial children born in the United
States increases each year.2 16 Approximately seven million Americans
claim more than one race.21 7 Further, "the majority of [W]hite Ameri-
cans have African Blood," and the majority of Blacks have White blood,
and a substantial number have Indian blood. 2 8 Finally, the newest
groups of immigrants coming to the United States no longer fit into the
pre-conceived American classifications of race.21 9 Consider that in the
current decade, approximately 25,000 Cubans, 10,000 Iranians, 9,000
Jamacians, 50,000 Filipinos, and 44,000 Asian Indians immigrate to the
United States each year. 22 ' Arguably, only Filipinos can sufficiently
identify themselves on a university application.
Consider also, amongst the United States' Black population, several
sub-groups exist that identify themselves as entirely separate from their
213. SARUP, supra note 137, at 180.
214. HERZOG ET AL., supra note 149 (listing the groups that the school has committed
to including in the student body).
215. STEVE SAILER, RACE Now 1 (United Press Int'l 2002).
216. See id. (revealing that the United States Census in 2000 indicated the number of
offspring to mixed race couples doubled in the past twelve years).
217. See NICHOLAS A. JONES & AMY SYMENS SMITH, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
CENSUS 2000 BRIEF: THE Two OR MORE RACES POPULATION: 2000 (2001), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbrOl-6.pdf.
218. John A. Powell, The Colorblind Multiracial Dilemma: Racial Categories Recon-
sidered, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 789, 797 (1997); see Steve Sailer, Race Now 1 (United Press Int'l
2002) (interpreting the Census 2000 data to show "a large fraction of African-Americans
possess some white ancestors").
219. NANCY F. RYTINA, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., REFUGEE APPLICANTS AND
ADMISSIONS TO THE UNITED STATES: 2004 2 tbl. 2 (2005) (revealing, for example, in 2004,
14,035 Laotian refugees and 1,561 Iranian refugees were granted asylum in the United
States from 2002 to 2004). Neither of these nationalities fit neatly into a racial group on
most university applications. See id.
220. U.S. IMMIGRATION COMM'N, IMMIGRATION INFORMATION STATISTICS, http://
www.uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/299.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2006).
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Black counterparts.2 21 Similarly, Asians can be a variety of distinct na-
tionalities from Vietnamese, to Sri Lankan, to Indonesian, while Hispan-
ics include Mexicans, Cubans, Puerto Ricans, and a host of Central and
South American nationalities.
The above examples indicate that the lines separating America's no-
tions of 'race' are slowly but surely fading into grey.22 2 As Professor
Victor Romero wisely observed, "using broad categories such as 'Asians'
and 'Latinas' to divide candidates between those who are and who are
not presumptively diverse fails to accurately capture significant segments
of America's population .... hose backgrounds traverse and transgress
group boundaries. ,221 Subsequently, a substantial percentage of the
United States population is simply unable to identify themselves
accurately.
Consider the following facts. The United States Census Bureau reports
that ethnic groups of Southeast Asia (Indonesians, Laotians, Cambodi-
ans, and Hmong) have a socioeconomic status ranking near the bottom in
America.224 Southeast Asians are markedly lagging in all aspects of soci-
ety when compared to the rest of the United States, but especially when
compared to their "Asian" counterparts from South and East Asia.225
Second, according to research conducted by the American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Committee Research Institute, Arabs have been increas-
ingly discriminated against as an ethnic group within the United States.226
Third, ethnicities with low socioeconomic statuses and ethnicities that
have been historically discriminated against in the United States tend to
have lower representation in higher education. 227 A logical conclusion
221. See NICHOLAS A. JONES & AMY SYMENS SMITH, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
CENSUS 2000 BRIEF: THE Two OR MORE RACES POPULATION: 2000 (2001), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr0l-6.pdf. Sailer, supra note 215 (Indicating
that in Massachusetts, many Blacks actually classify themselves as part Cape Verdeans).
222. Sailer, supra note 215 (showing the increase in the number of persons born to
two race parents has doubled in the last twelve years).
223. Victor C. Romero, Are Filipinas Asians or Latinas?: Reclaiming the Anti-Subor-
dination Objective of Equal Protection after Grutter and Gratz, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 765,
770 (2005).
224. TERRANCE J. REEVES & CLAUDETTE E. BENNETT, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
CENSUS 2000: SPECIAL REPORTS: WE THE PEOPLE: ASIANS IN THE UNITED STATES 17
(2004), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/censr-17.pdf (stating the numbers
for Laotians, Cambodians, and Hmong nearly mirror those for Blacks and Hispanics).
225. Id.
226. Hussein Ibish, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. Research Inst., Re-
port on Hate Crimes and Discrimination Against Arabs: The Post 9-11 Backlash 20 (2002),
http://server.traffic.northwestern.edu/events/rps/shora.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2006).
227. ANTHONY P. CARNEVALE & STEPHEN J. ROSE, SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS, RACE/
ETHNICITY, AND SELECTIVE COLLEGE ADMISSIONS 10-11 (2003).
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based on these facts is that Southeast Asians and Arabs are probably not
represented well in universities. 2 8
Although this may be true, there is no way to easily verify the conclu-
sion. Because Southeast Asians are grouped together with other more
successful groups such as South Asians (Indian-Americans in the United
States are very successful) and East Asians (Chinese-Americans, Japa-
nese-Americans, and Korean-Americans are also very successful in the
United States) in university racial identification data, we cannot tell
Southeast Asians truly are as poorly represented as it would seem. Like-
wise, Arabs, usually grouped with Whites (but sometimes Blacks and
Asians), are not accounted for as a separate group in racial data.
By excluding such groups from affirmative action admissions programs,
universities are committing per se equal protection violations.2" 9 This ef-
fect, where disadvantaged ethnicities are grouped with, and overshad-
owed by, successful groups, is the principal problem of using overbroad
and imprecise racial classifications.
Unfortunately, unconstitutional discrimination and a lack of data are
not the only problems created by currently used racial categories. The
inability to accurately identify creates several other crucial problems in
university admissions: (1) the dilution of applicant identity; (2) in-fight-
ing amongst minority sub-groups for limited positions of the "critical
mass;" (3) racial gerrymandering; and (4) the failure to produce a diverse
crop of minority leaders. Each of these problems will be discussed, in
turn, below.
E. Dilution of Identity
The first major policy problem that imprecise racial classifications
cause is the dilution of applicant identity. When a prospective student is
asked to choose a "race" on an application with which they do not iden-
tify, the entire ethnic group they belong to begins to lose recognition.23 °
This dilution is readily apparent amongst "Asians., 231
1. "Asians"
Dilution of applicant identity occurs when ethnic groups that are differ-
ent from one another get lumped together as one group for identification
purposes.232 The over-encompassing "Asian" race classification is an ex-
228. See id. at 11.
229. Romero, supra note 223, at 772.
230. Omi, supra note 169, at 17.
231. Romero, supra note 223, at 769 (suggesting when Filipinas, for example, must
chose between "Latina" and "Asian," they must compromise their identity).
232. Omi, supra note 169, at 17.
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ample; grouping the very different South Asians (e.g., Indians), East
Asians (e.g., Chinese), and Southeast Asians (e.g., Indonesians) into one
supposedly homogenous group. The result of this grouping, as ethnic
studies Professor Michael Omi points out, is that "[t]he panethnic organi-
zation of Asian Americans involved the muting of profound cultural and
linguistic differences and significant historical antagonisms, which existed
among the distinct nationalities and ethnic groups of Asian origin ....
Panethnic formations such as this are not stable." '233
Based on a 2003 survey by the United States Census Bureau, there
"appears to be a growing desire among many individuals for a more
country-based, as opposed to race-based, self-identification process, 23 4
when applicable. This "growing desire" seems to be a natural response to
the federal government's erosion of nationalities and cultures in order to
conform all citizens to preset racial definitions.235 For example, on the
Law School's application and the Law School Admissions Council's
("LSAC") identification forms, Korean-Americans and Pakistani-Ameri-
cans are both limited to define themselves under the broad umbrella of
"Asian." Koreans and Pakistanis clearly have different and distinct cul-
tures, physical attributes, languages, religions, customs, and, most impor-
tantly, are perceived as two separate groups in society. Yet for
admissions purposes at the Law School and most other higher educa-
tional institutions, the two are treated as one race.
The above example illustrates many of the inherent problems with clas-
sifying so many different nationalities, ethnicities, and cultures into a few
broadly defined races.2 36 Namely, that people from different ethnic
groups within a race, or in the case of Asia, from different regions of the
continent, are just plain different.237 Though people from various regions
of Asia238 may share some similar characteristics, the only relevant fea-
ture common amongst all people from the continent of Asia is geographic
location. As Professor Romero opines, the desire amongst various
Asian-American ethnic groups to collect census data based on ethnicity
233. Id.
234. Romero, supra note 223, at 772. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, SUPER EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF THE DEVELOPMENT As-
SOCIATES CENSUS 2003 PRETEST: SIx ALTERNATIVE FORMS (2003), available at http://www.
census.gov/cac/www/20032004TestHispanicOrginQues.html.
235. Romero, supra note 223, at 772.
236. Id. at 772-73 (suggesting a trend in university applications to mirror the census in
that "ethnic specificity and away from larger group affiliation underlies an implicit realiza-
tion that group affiliation dilutes individualism and masks the diversity apparent among
subgroup members").
237. See id.
238. For example, South Asia (e.g., India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka) East Asia (e.g.,
China, Japan, and Korea) Southeast Asian (e.g., Cambodia, Laos, and Burma).
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"and away from larger group affiliation underlies an implicit realization
that [large] group affiliation dilutes individualism and masks the diversity
apparent among subgroup members."'239 In truth, there is no sound basis
other than geographic proximity for treating the wide assortment of cul-
tures in Asia as one homogenous group.
Additionally, the over-broad racial classifications are unable to take
into account the economic, social, and political disparities of each sub-
group of the "Asian race., 240  Specifically, the Southeast Asians
(Cambodians, Laotians, and Hmong) are markedly lagging in all realms
of American society in comparison to their Asian counterparts. 24
1
Large portions of the Southeast Asian population in the United States
are recent immigrants who came into the country as refugees fleeing civil
wars.242 Most of these refugees came to the United States with no money
or transferable skills and thus were forced into a low-income lifestyle.
Contrastingly, Chinese, Japanese, Indian, and Filipino-Americans are
now well beyond third generations, have established communities, edu-
cated their children, gained political power, and progressed through soci-
ety at a rapid speed.243 So why is it that Laotians (Southeast Asian) and
Japanese (East Asian) are considered on equal footing in the university
admissions process? Surely, universities do not suggest that the two na-
tionalities are equivalent from a diversity standpoint. Or is it that Lao-
tians are represented in meaningful numbers because there are plenty of
other "Asians" in the student body? It is true that Laotians compose
only a 1.6% of the "Asian" population in America and only a fraction of
the total population.24' However, the four dominant Asian sub-groups
(Chinese, Japanese, Indian, and Filipino) compose only sixty-six percent
of the total Asian population in the United States.245 Should the other
thirty-four have to suffer a lack of representation because their distinctly
different Asian counterparts are more successful? Why are courts more
interested in having meaningful representation of Blacks and Latinos, but
239. Romero, supra note 223, at 772.
240. REEVES & BENNETT, supra note 224.
241. Id. at 20. For instance, sixty percent of Indians are employed in "management,
professional, and related occupations," whereas only thirteen percent of fellow "Asians"
from Laos were employed in such positions. Id. Further, the median salary and average
household income for South and East Asian-Americans is approximately double that for
Southeast Asian-Americans. Id. Finally, the poverty rates for Hmong, Cambodians, and
Laotians are well above the national rate, and approximately double that of fellow Asians
from Japan, India, and the Philippines. Id.
242. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE. RACIAL AND ETHNIC CLASSI-
FICATIONS USED IN CENSUS 2000 AND BEYOND (2000).
243. REEVES & BENNETr, supra note 224.
244. Id. at 4.
245. Id.
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not of Sri Lankans or Cambodians? It cannot be because of the history
of discrimination against Blacks and Latinos in the United States; reme-
dying past societal discrimination was dismissed as a justification for race-
based admissions programs.246 Current racial classifications in the uni-
versity admissions process not only fail to recognize struggling and under-
represented Asian sub-groups, but by classifying these subgroups as
"sufficiently represented" or "overrepresented" Asians, universities aid
in the oppression of these nationalities. As one author expressed,
"[f]ailure to acknowledge the 'underrepresented' Asian Americans will
also perpetuate their invisibility and prevent others from recognizing
their existence. If the Court allows schools to treat them accordingly, it
hinders non-Asian students and society from understanding the myriad
cultures and experiences within the Asian race." '247
2. "Arabs"
Maybe the most troubling aspect of the Directive 15 and University of
Michigan's racial classifications is the exclusion of Arabs.248 Several Arab
American groups have lobbied the federal government, including the
OMB and public universities, to include a Middle Eastern or Arab cate-
gory for identification purposes.249 Yet, most public institutions and pro-
grams still do not accommodate Arab ethnic identity. 50
In recent years, Arab-Americans have, statistically, been one of the
most discriminated and misunderstood minority groups in the United
States.251 The American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee Research
Institute reported that, just in 2002 alone, there were over 700 violent
attacks on people who were perceived to be Arab, eighty cases of air-
plane passenger removals due to "Arab appearance," over 800 cases of
employment discrimination against Arab-Americans, and several in-
stances of housing discrimination.252 More relevant to Grutter, there
have also been several instances of on-campus hate crimes targeting
246. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 271-72 (1978).
247. Victoria Choy, Perpetuating the Exclusion of Asian Americans from the Affirma-
tive Action Debate: An Oversight of the Diversity Rationale in Grutter v. Bollinger, 38 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 545, 570 (2005).
248. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SUBMIS-
SION FOR OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET REVIEW: COMMENT REQUEST, 66 Fed.
Reg. 12923 (Mar. 1, 2001); HERZOG ET AL., supra note 149.
249. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 242.
250. Id.
251. Ibish, supra note 226.




Arabs on various university campuses.2 13 If cross-racial understanding
and the breaking down of racial stereotypes is truly the aim of the Uni-
versity of Michigan's affirmative action program, then admissions policies
should be tailored to achieve a "critical mass" of the very misunderstood
and discriminated against Arab ethnicity.
The lack of understanding of Middle Eastern ethnicities results in nu-
merous incidents and stories that show that most Westerners cannot dis-
tinguish between a person who is Sikh and a person who is Arab.254
Although the Sikh are from northern India, speak languages altogether
different than Arabic, and are not Islamic, most people who look at a
Sikh will associate that person with an Arab country because Sikh's wear
turbans, and turbans are commonly associated with Muslims. This is pre-
cisely the racial stereotyping that the Court sought to alleviate with more
diverse classrooms. However, without giving Sikh-Americans or Arab-
Americans a chance to properly identify themselves, they will be pre-
cluded from receiving the extra "plus" they may need to achieve mean-
ingful representation. The exclusion leaves Arabs with the choice of
identifying themselves as White, Asian, or African (which leads to the
problem of inter-ethnic fights for affirmative action spots that is ad-
dressed below).255
F. In-fighting
The second unfortunate effect of current racial classifications is that
"minorities might be tempted to forego constructive, anti-subordination
coalition building in favor of in-fighting over limited affirmative action
programs . "..."256 In other words, if people who are of different ethnici-
ties, such as Mexicans and Haitians, both identify themselves as Hispan-
ics, the groups will end up fighting each other for limited portions of the
Hispanic "critical mass. 257 Black-Americans will be harmed when North
African Arabs (e.g., Egyptians and Algerians) identify themselves as Af-
rican-American because North Africans can be used to satisfy the "criti-
253. Muslim Public Affairs Council, Pig's Blood Splattered on Muslim Prayer Rugs at
UCLA Medical Center (Apr. 23, 2003), http://www.mpac.org.article.php?id=211 (reporting
an instance when Islamic prayer rugs were splattered with pig's blood at the University of
California at Los Angeles).
254. See Nabanita Sircar, UK Sikhs Fear Racist Attacks, HINDUSTAN TIMES (London)
(July 10, 2005), available at http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/181_1426549,00050003.
htm.
255. Zearfoss, supra note 77 (writing that the University of Michigan Law School's
Director of Admissions states that Arabs are classified as White by the University).
256. Romero, supra note 223, at 768.
257. Id. at 769.
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cal mass" of the "Black/African-American" race. 58 This result will cause
in-fighting amongst Black-Americans and African-Arabs (and any other
ethnicities who choose to classify themselves as African-American) for
limited spots of the critical mass, when, instead, the two groups could best
further their collective interests by joining together to form minority
coalitions. 2 5 9
Some may argue that this scenario cannot happen because, technically,
the "critical mass" formula is not supposed to be a quota. However, as
Justice Rehnquist pointed out in his dissent, the critical mass, of under-
represented minorities at the University of Michigan Law School has re-
mained constant for several years, and it can thus be inferred that after
the critical mass has been achieved for a certain underrepresented race,
lower scoring applicants of that race will no longer be considered.2 6 ° In
truth, there is only a certain amount of "pluses" to go around, and the
University will grant just enough pluses to achieve the critical mass it is
looking for.2 61 Handing out more pluses than necessary to achieve diver-
sity would be a per se violation of the Equal Protection Clause.26 2 The
ultimate effect is that Black-Americans and North Africans Arab-Ameri-
cans will have to compete for these pluses as they will fall under the same
race in the University of Michigan Law School's application.263 The obvi-
ous flaw in this system is that both North African Arab-Americans and
Black-Americans diversify student bodies in different ways and should
not be pitted against each other for limited affirmative action assis-
tance.2 64 Instead, universities should aim to achieve critical masses of
both of these distinct ethnicities.2 65 Forcing minorities to fight for spots
and pluses will eventually lead to segregation of minority interests and
hinder cross-racial coalition building.26 6
G. Racial Gerrymandering
A third major problem caused by imprecise racial designations is a phe-
nomenon described here as "racial gerrymandering." There is great po-
tential for abuse by applicants if universities publicly acknowledge their
desire to reach a "critical mass" of certain races. Current policies inad-
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 379 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
261. See generally Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
262. See generally id.; Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990); City of Rich-
mond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
263. Romero, supra note 223, at 769.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 775.
266. Id. at 769.
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vertently induce applicants who do not neatly fall into listed racial catego-
ries (or none at all) to identify themselves with a race favored by the
university, over their own premonitions of who they really are. It has
been documented that "some Filipinas have attempted to distance them-
selves from other Asians in order to emphasize their unique cultural
background and to acquire affirmative action benefits." '2 6 7 Further, the
Native American population in a ten-year period increased 110% from
1990 to 2000, a number that is almost demographically impossible consid-
ering that there is virtually no immigration of Native Americans.2 68
Much of this increase can be attributed to the fact that Native Americans
were given preferential treatment through affirmative action programs
after 1960.269 Therefore, presumably, there was a greater incentive to
identify oneself as a Native American after 1960.27o
Because university admissions are a competitive game, opportunism is
inherent. A self-interested applicant who can find a link between her
identity and an underrepresented race has every reason to categorize her-
self as that underrepresented race, even if another listed race is more
fitting.27 1 This effect of current racial classifications hampers the goals
stated in Grutter. Namely, people who do not diversify the student body
in the way the Grutter court envisioned (i.e., those people who are so
similar to the majority that they do not promote cross-racial understand-
ing or breaking down of stereotypes) can "gerrymander" their identity to
fit an underrepresented race.
Inherent in the goal of attaining "cross-racial understanding" and the
breaking down of stereotypes is the fact that a student must be able to
recognize that he/she is dealing with someone of a different "race." Al-
lowing minorities who are not visibly different from the majority to gerry-
mander their way into a student body does not promote the cross-racial
understanding and interaction with other ethnicities, which is what the
Grutter court envisioned. According to Grutter, the fact that people may
carry a unique viewpoint because of their incongruence with a specific
race does not matter in the analysis because "[a]s far as the reader can
tell from the Court's opinion, the educational benefits that result in a
267. Id. at 775 (pointing out that Filipinos often opt to choose 'Latino' as their race
because most Filipinos have Spanish descendants).
268. See Charles Hirschman, The Origins and Demise of the Concept of Race, 30 Pop-
ULATION & DEV. REV. 385, 406 (2004) (citing JEFFREY PASSEL, THE GROWING AMERICAN
INDIAN POPULATION, 1960-1990: BEYOND DEMOGRAPHY (1996)).
269. Id. at 406 (citing JEFFREY PASSEL, THE GROWING AMERICAN INDIAN POPULA-
nON, 1960-1990 BEYOND DEMOGRAPHY (1996)).
270. Id.
271. See Romero, supra note 223, at 771 (stating Justice Scalia named the increasing
likelihood one will chose to amplify their minority background as a "race to the bottom").
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compelling state interest flow all but exclusively from racial as opposed to
viewpoint-oriented diversity." '272 Therefore, unless overbroad classifica-
tions are broken down and replaced with ethnic groups, applicants will
continue to force their way into affirmative action programs.2 73
H. Current Racial Classifications Do Not Assure the Production of
Minority Leaders
Finally, the current racial classifications do not even work with Justice
O'Connor's fallback justification for diversity - the production of minor-
ity leaders.2 74 As stated previously, the Court held that diversity is vital
to the production of "a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of citi-
zenry[.] ' '275 As one author summarized, "the Court seemed to be saying
that racial preferences in admission are a compelling interest because
they help assure the continued production of minority leaders as well as
the perception that minorities have a fair chance to receive leadership
training. "276 If this truly is another interest justifying the use of race-
based admissions programs, then shouldn't we attempt to achieve a criti-
cal mass of Arab or Asian Indian students? There are very few Arabs,
South Asians, or Southeast Asians in the United States government. If
the Court was seeking to ensure the production of minority leaders
through a diverse student body, it would be logical to extend a plus to
Arabs and Southeast Asians so that they have a better chance at entering
leadership positions. The famed "3M brief,' '27 7 which Justice O'Connor
relied so heavily upon in her opinion, specifically focused on internation-
ally oriented diversity and the challenges of a global marketplace. 278 This
flies in the face of excluding Southeast Asians, Arabs, and South Asians
from affirmative action programs.
272. Bloom, supra note 14, at 472.
273. Romero, supra note 223, at 773. Of course, even when using ethnic categories
there will still be some applicants who choose to identify outside of their most closely
matched ethnicity. See id. However, applicants will feel less capable, ethnically, to do so
when a certain ethnicity is right on point. See id. For instance, Egyptian-Americans, pre-
sumably, will choose Arab instead of Black-American because they cannot ethically disa-
vow their Middle Eastern heritage as easily as they could their "White" heritage. See id.
Further, there should be no desire to identify outside of the Arab ethnicity because schools
should be attempting to achieve a critical mass of Arabs comparable to that of other
ethnicities. See id.
274. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 308, 332 (2003) (majority opinion).
275. Id. at 308, 328.
276. Bloom, supra note 14, at 476.
277. Brief for 65 Leading American Businesses as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respon-




I. Did the Court Have an Ulterior Motive?
Before examining possible solutions to curing the imprecision of racial
identification on university applications, it is worth mentioning that many
critics have asserted that the Supreme Court's diversity rationale was sim-
ply a ploy to validate the University of Michigan's affirmative action pro-
gram.279 The theory is that the Court actually believed that the race-
based admissions program was necessary, not for diversity (or not for di-
versity alone), but instead to cure past societal harms caused by oppres-
sion, bias, and bigotry. However, because the Court felt bound by its
precedent in Bakke, the diversity rationale was put forth as an alterna-
tive. Even if this were true and the Court is concerned more with helping
disadvantaged applicants rather than encouraging diversity, the Univer-
sity of Michigan's racial categories are still unconstitutional because those
categories discriminate without achieving a compelling government inter-
est. Recall that with imprecise racial categories, applicants can ethnically
identify themselves with any category that receives a "plus" if they have a
legitimate justification for doing so. This leads to less representation of
the historically discriminated against minority groups such as Mexican-
Americans and Black-Americans in favor of, for instance, Whites with
Spanish surnames and North African Arab-Americans. s° Thus, regard-
less of the Court's true justification for upholding the university's admis-
sions program, the current racial categories should not be used because
they do not promote either diversity or redress.
V. THE SOLUTION
A. Require Precision
Fortunately, the problem of imprecise racial classifications is solvable:
either define races more precisely or shift away from racial classifications
and use nationality and ethnicity as identifiers. In the age of online ad-
missions applications28 l and large admissions staffs, the ability to conduct
thorough and individualized reviews of every applicant is more possible
than ever. When race is a factor in admissions, the level of care and dili-
gence in reviewing each application should be at its absolute maximum,
and individualized review should be all but guaranteed. So why do uni-
279. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 308, 383-85 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
280. Romero, supra note 223, at 773.
281. Every law school in the U.S. News' top 50 list had an online application. It is safe
to assume that most all universities have online applications to stay competitive. Regard-
less, nearly all law schools accept personal information vital to admissions from the Law
School Admissions Council ("LSAC").
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versities continue to group applicants in large archaic racial groups and
remove the individuality out of application review?28 2
1. Redefining Race
One way to increase the precision of self-identification on applications
is to reclassify the current racial groups listed on application forms. For
instance divide "Asian" into East Asian/Oriental, South Asian/Indian,
and Southeast Asian/Indochinese; 28 3 include an Arab race; sub-divide
"Latinos" into Central Americans, South Americans, Islanders and in-
clude a black/white component to each of these designations;2 84 and fi-
nally, distinguish between White-Africans, Indian-Africans, and Black-
Africans to avoid gerrymandering.
2. Moving Away from Race
A better approach would eliminate race altogether and, instead, use
nationality and ethnicity as the factors in admissions that contribute most
to diversity. Nationality and ethnicity are better indicators of diversity
than race, and substituting those factors for race will alleviate many of the
identification problems associated with the university application process.
If nationality and ethnicity were used in place of race, applicants could be
evaluated individually on a sliding scale, with the most represented
ethnicities receiving the least amount of "pluses" and the least repre-
sented ethnicities receiving the most number of "pluses." Under this ap-
proach, each ethnicity and each sub-group within each ethnicity (e.g.,
Nationality - Algerian, Ethnicity - Arab) can each have their own "criti-
cal mass" if the school wishes. Further, this approach will give admissions
staffs leeway to admit as many different kinds of people as they deems
necessary to diversify their student body, without having to take blind
guesses as to whether the applicant is truly "diverse." This method en-
sures that Black-Americans and Mexican-Americans achieve meaningful
282. America's Best Graduate Schools 2007: Top Law Schools, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., http://www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/grad/rankings/law/briefllawrank-brief.php. A
possible argument is that smaller schools will simply not have the resources and personnel
to collect and evaluate the added "ethnic." Id. However, smaller and less prominent
schools, statistically, receive considerably less applications than larger and more prominent
schools; therefore, a small state school would not be overwhelmed by extra review. See id.
283. REEVES & BENNE-Ir, supra note 224 (acknowledging the differences between the
three major sub-groups of 'Asians' and defining 'Asian' as "people having origins in any of
the original peoples of the Far East, Southeast Asia, or the Indian subcontinent").
284. This would be more acceptable than just having white and black as separate
races. E.g., South American/Black and South American/White would be two separate
groups, each diversifying a student body in a different manner.
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representation in student bodies, but also ensures meaningful representa-
tion for ethnicities that were not recognized under the old scheme.
B. Potential Shortcomings
Admissions staffs will make two main arguments as to why this pro-
posed multi-factored test is unworkable: (1) collecting that data is much
too hard and cannot be easily gathered through application forms; and
(2) admissions staffs do not have the personnel to analyze the increased
number of factors in that sort of a policy.
1. Collecting Data
With the move of applications from paper to the internet, a new world
of possibilities has been opened as to how to input data, collect it, and
even how it can be analyzed. In terms of identification data, a simple
drop-down menu can be implemented to acquire an applicant's national-
ity and/or her ethnicity. Applications should also include a means to in-
put multiple nationality/ethnicity selections for applicants who are multi-
ethnic (or "multi-racial," as it is commonly called).
2. Analyzing the Data
It is true that sifting through the added identification information cre-
ates an added nuisance for admissions staffs. However, once this pro-
posed system is implemented, it should not create a significant additional
burden for admissions staffs. Admissions offices will continue to receive
the same type of information regarding the diversity of the applicant, but,
under this proposal, they will have more accurate information. Although
it may be more difficult for admissions staffs to keep track of how many
of a certain type of race/ethnicity have been admitted, this should not
result in an insurmountable obstacle. Universities are not allowed to
keep racial quotas, so the only use in tracking the number of a certain
race/ethnicity is to achieve a critical mass of students. If it is apparent, via
a post-application review scan of the proposed student body, that a de-
sired critical mass has not been achieved through initial applicant reviews,
admissions staffs can always go back to the applicant pool and pull the
applicants needed to achieve the critical mass.
Still, many will argue that this process is much too cumbersome and
onerous for admissions staffs. As has been mentioned time and time
again in judicial opinions, legal treatises, law reviews, Grutter, and this
article in the instances that the use of race can be justified as a factor in
government policy, the policy must be narrowly tailored to avoid discrim-
ination as best as possible. If a university wants to use race as a factor in
its admissions, it should have a duty to keep a large and capable admis-
sions staff at hand.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The University of Michigan Law School's race-based admissions policy
should have been rejected as unconstitutional in Grutter because of its
unanticipated discrimination against several minority groups that do not
conform to traditional Americanized racial classifications. By allowing
the policy to stand, the Supreme Court did a disservice to the advance-
ment of minorities and countered its goal of achieving diverse classrooms.
Diversity simply cannot be achieved by admitting a certain number of
applicants who fall into the archaic classifications adopted thirty years
ago. The demographics of the United States have changed profoundly
since Directive 15 was first adopted. It no longer makes sense to follow
Directive 15 standards when more precise designations exist. Accord-
ingly, the Supreme Court has stunted the growth of diverse student bod-
ies at universities and set the scene for a plethora of new equal protection
lawsuits from new minority groups that are being discriminated against.

